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Abstract
The application scenarios envisioned for ‘global ubiquitous computing’ have unique requirements that are
often incompatible with traditional security paradigms. One alternative currently being investigated is
to support security decision-making by explicit representation of principals’ trusting relationships, i.e.,
via systems for computational trust. We focus here on systems where trust in a computational entity is
interpreted as the expectation of certain future behaviour based on behavioural patterns of the past, and
concern ourselves with the foundations of such probabilistic systems. In particular, we aim at establishing
formal probabilistic models for computational trust and their fundamental properties. In the paper we
deﬁne a mathematical measure for quantitatively comparing the eﬀectiveness of probabilistic computational
trust systems in various environments. Using it, we compare some of the systems from the computational
trust literature; the comparison is derived formally, rather than obtained via experimental simulation as
traditionally done. With this foundation in place, we formalise a general notion of information about past
behaviour, based on event structures. This yields a ﬂexible trust model where the probability of complex
protocol outcomes can be assessed.
Keywords: Bayesian model, trust model, probabilistic system, event structures
1 Introduction
Part of the Grand Challenge of a science for global ubiquitous computing (GUC) [5]
is to ﬁnd alternatives to existing approaches to access control, and, more generally,
security sensitive decision making. Many new features of GUC (virtual anonymity,
scalability, mobility, autonomy, ubiquity, incomplete information, global connectiv-
ity, . . . ) will aﬀect our notion of security requirements. For example, mobility
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implies that a GUC entity might ﬁnd itself in a hostile environment, disconnected
from its preferred security infrastructure, e.g., its usual certiﬁcation authorities.
Further, the autonomy requirement means that even in this scenario, it must be
able to assign privileges to other GUC entities; privileges that are meaningful based
on usually incomplete information the assigning entity has about the assigned en-
tity. These properties of GUC imply that traditional security mechanisms are no
longer applicable (see e.g., Blaze, Feigenbaum et al [1]). One of the alternatives
currently being investigated is an approach based on the notion of trust that, in
some ways, resembles the concept of trust as it exists among human beings. We re-
fer to this line of research as computational trust. In fact, computational trust deals
not merely with access control, but more generally with decision making by com-
putational agents in the presence of unknown, uncontrollable and possibly harmful
entities. This is the case for e.g. the autonomous selection of (apparently similar)
providers of particular services.
In the area of computational trust it is hard to identify one model (or even a
few) accepted widely by the community. The GUC feature of incomplete informa-
tion naturally leads to probabilistic decision making; hence, one common classiﬁ-
cation distinguishes between ‘probabilistic’ and ‘non-probabilistic’ models [8,21,13].
The non-probabilistic systems may be further classiﬁed into diﬀerent types (e.g.,
social networks or cognitive); in contrast, the probabilistic systems usually have a
common objective and structure: they (i) assume a particular (probabilistic) model
for principal behaviour; and (ii) put forward algorithms for approximating the be-
haviour of principals (i.e., for making predictions in the model). In such models
the trust information about a principal is information about its past behaviour, its
history. Such histories do not immediately classify principals as ‘trustworthy’ or
‘untrustworthy,’ as ‘good’ or ‘bad;’ rather, they are used to estimate the probability
of potential outcomes arising in a next interaction with an entity. Probabilistic sys-
tems, called ‘game-theoretical’ by Sabater and Sierra [21], are based on Gambetta’s
view of trust [9]: “. . . trust (or, symmetrically, distrust) is a particular level of the
subjective probability with which an agent assesses that another agent or group of
agents will perform a particular action, both before he can monitor such action (or
independently of his capacity ever to be able to monitor it) and in a context in
which it aﬀects his own action.”
The contribution of this paper is inspired by such a predictive view of trust. Any
probabilistic model is predicated on an underlying model of interaction amongst
computing entities, and for this purpose we use the event structures of Plotkin et al
[18], as previously argued for in [17] and [14]. We equip event structures with proba-
bilities as in Varacca et al [23], and we follow the Bayesian approach to probability
theory as advocated in e.g. [10]. In fact, we develop a probabilistic extension of
the event structure framework we previously used in the SECURE project [4], and
we use it to model outcomes of interactions and make predictions using Bayesian
learning on their conﬁgurations. In this sense, our framework generalises previous
probabilistic models with only ‘binary’ outcomes [16,8,22] – i.e., where each inter-
action is perceived as either ‘good’ or ‘bad’ – to multiple, structured outcomes.
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Such outcomes may in simple cases represent diﬀerent degrees of satisfaction on
the ‘good’–‘bad’ scale, or in more complex cases exploit the full expressive power of
event structures’ causation mechanisms.
Bayesian analysis consists of formulating hypotheses on some real-world phe-
nomenon, running experiments to test such hypothesis, and thereafter updating the
hypotheses –if necessary– to provide a better explanation of the experimental obser-
vations, a better ﬁt of the hypotheses to the observed behaviours. By formulating
it in terms of conditional probabilities on the space of interest, this procedure is
expressed succinctly in formulae by Bayes’ Theorem:
Prob(Θ | X) ∝ Prob(X | Θ) · Prob(Θ).
Reading from left to right, the formula is interpreted as saying: the probability of
the hypotheses Θ posterior to the outcome of experiment X is proportional to the
likelihood of such outcome under the hypotheses multiplied by the probability of
the hypotheses prior to the experiment. 4 In the present context, the prior Θ will
be an estimate of the probability of each potential outcome in our next interaction
with principal p, whilst the posterior will be our amended estimate after one such
interaction took place with outcome X.
It is important to observe here that Prob(Θ | X) is in a sense a second order
notion, and we are not interested in computing it for any particular value of Θ.
Indeed, as Θ is the unknown in our problem, we are interested in deriving the
entire distribution in order to compute its expected value, and use it as our next
estimate for Θ.
In order to make this discussion more concrete, let us ﬁrst focus on a model
of binary outcomes. Here Θ can be represented by a single probability Θp, the
probability that principal p will behave benevolently, i.e., that an interaction with
p will be successful. In this case, a sequence of n experiments X = X1 · · ·Xn is a
sequence of binomial (Bernoulli) trials, and is modelled by a binomial distribution
Prob(X consists of k successes) = Θkp(1−Θp)n−k.
It turns out that if the prior Θ follows a β-distribution, say B(α, β) ∝ Θα−1p (1 −
Θp)
β−1 of parameters α and β, then so does the posterior: viz., if X is an n-sequence
of k successes, Prob(Θ | X) is B(α+ k, β+n− k), the β-distribution of parameters
α + k and β + n − k. This is a particularly happy circumstance when it comes to
apply Bayes’ Theorem, because it makes it straightforward to compute the posterior
distribution and its expected value from the prior and the observations; it is known
in the literature as the condition that the β-distribution family is a conjugate prior
for the binomial trials.
As described above, our model of choice departs from the view of interaction
as a sequence of events with binary (success/failure) outcomes. Technically, we see
4 We shall often omit the proportionality factor, as that is uniquely determined as the constant that makes
the right-hand side term a probability distribution. In fact, it equals Prob(X)−1.
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conﬁgurations of ﬁnite, confusion-free event structures as arising from sequences
of independent, multiple probabilistic choices. Mathematically, this entails passing
from the binomial distributions typical of binomial trials to multinomial distribu-
tions Θn11 . . .Θ
nk
k (with
∑
Θi = 1) typical of n-sequences of trials (n =
∑
ni) with k
distinct outcomes. In this new framework, our Bayesian analysis relies on observing
sequences of event structure conﬁgurations –one event at the time– to ‘learn’ (i.e.,
estimate) the probability of each conﬁguration occurring as the outcome of the next
complex (sequence of elementary) interactions. Here of course Θi represents our
current estimation of the probability that the ith event in the k-way choice. Corre-
spondingly, we need to identify a suitable conjugate prior to multinomial trials, to
replace the β distribution in the application of Bayes’ Theorem. As we explain in
§4, we identify it in the family of Dirichlet distribution
D(α1, . . . , αk) ∝ Θα1−11 · · ·Θαk−1k .
In complete analogy with the binary case, and thus determining a smooth and uni-
form lifting of the theory, if the prior follows a Dirichlet distribution D(α1, . . . , αk),
then the posterior Prob(Θ | X) follows the Dirichlet distribution
D(α1 + #1(X), . . . , αk + #k(X)),
where #i(X) counts the occurrences of event i in the sequence X. We remark that
a similar observation was independently made in [11,20].
Our second contribution in this paper is the deﬁnition of a formal measure
expressing the quality of probabilistic computational trust systems in various ap-
plication environments. The measure is based on the so-called Kullback-Leibler
divergence [15], also known as information divergence or relative entropy, used in
the information theory literature to measure the ‘distance’ from an approximation to
a known target probability distribution. Here we shall adapt it to measure how well
an computational trust algorithm approximates the ‘true’ probabilistic behaviours
of computing entities and, therefore, to provide a formal benchmark for the com-
parison of such algorithms. As an illustration of the applicability of the theory, we
present theoretical results within the ﬁeld, regarding a whole class of existing prob-
abilistic trust algorithms. To our knowledge, no such approach has been proposed
previously (but cf. [6] for an application of similar concepts to anonymity). Indeed,
we consider this the main result of the paper, in that it presents the ﬁrst formal
results ever in way of comparison of computational trust algorithms.
Structure of the paper. The paper is organised as follows. In §2 we make precise
the scenario illustrated somehow informally in the Introduction, and prove our re-
sults on the formal of computational trust algorithms. For simplicity, we present our
arguments in the case where experiments are sequences of unstructured outcomes;
indeed, we expect all of them to go through mutatis mutandis to the case where
outcomes are event structure conﬁgurations. The rest of the paper is dedicated to
lifting the binary model to structured, distributed, complex outcomes aﬀorded by
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event structures. In §3 we introduce the model of probabilistic event structures;
readers acquainted with [23] may safely omit this section. In §4 we equip event
structures with Dirichlet distributions, and illustrate our event-based framework
for Bayesian analysis. Finally, §5 reﬂects on some of the basic hypotheses of the
probabilistic models illustrated in the paper, and points forward to future research
aimed at relaxing them.
2 Bayesian models for trust
At the outset, Bayesian trust models are based on the assumption that principals
behave in a way that can proﬁtably be approximated by ﬁxed probabilities. Accord-
ingly, while interacting with principal p one will constantly experience outcomes as
following an immutable probability distribution Θp. Such assumption may of course
be unrealistic in several real-world scenarios, and we shall discuss in §5 a research
programme aimed to lift it; for the moment however, we proceed to explore where
such an assumption leads us.
Our overall goal is to obtain an estimate of Θp in order to inform our future
policy of interaction with p. Computational trust algorithms attempt to do this
using Bayesian analysis on the history of past interactions with p. Let us ﬁx a
probabilistic model of principal behaviour, that is a set of basic assumptions on the
way principals behave, say λ, and then consider the behaviour of a single, ﬁxed
principal p. We shall focus on algorithms for the following problem: let X be an in-
teraction history x1, x2, . . . , xn obtained by interacting n times with p and observing
in sequence outcomes xi out of a set {y1, . . . , yk} of possible outcomes. A proba-
bilistic computational trust algorithm, say A, outputs on input X a probability
distribution on the outcomes {y1, . . . , yk}. That is, A satisﬁes:
A(yi | X) ∈ [0, 1] (i=1,...,k)
k∑
i=1
A(yi | X) = 1.
Such distribution is meant to to approximate a Θp under the hypotheses λ. To
make this precise, let us assume that the probabilistic model λ, deﬁnes the following
probabilities:
Prob(yi | X λ) : the probability of “observing yi in the next interaction,
given the past history X;”
Prob(X | λ) : the a priori probability of “observing X in the model λ.”
Now, Prob( · | X λ) deﬁnes the ‘true’ distribution on outcomes for the next interac-
tion (according to the model); in contrast, A( · | X) aims at approximating it. We
shall now propose a generic measure to ‘score’ speciﬁc algorithms A against given
probability distributions. The score, based on the so-called Kullback-Leibler diver-
gence, is a measure of how well the algorithm approximates the ‘true’ probabilistic
behaviour of principals.
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2.1 Towards Comparing Probabilistic Trust-based Systems
Closely related to Shannon’s notion of entropy, Kullback and Leibler’s information
divergence [15] is a measure of the distance between two probability distributions.
For p = (p1, . . . , pk) and q = (q1, q2, . . . , qm) distributions on a ﬁnite set of events,
the Kullback-Leibler divergence from p to q is deﬁned by
DKL(p ‖ q) =
k∑
i=1
pi log2(pi/qi),
where the log-base used is immaterial. Information divergence resembles a distance
in the mathematical sense: it can be proved that DKL satisﬁes DKL(p ‖ q) ≥ 0 and
that equality is obtained if and only if p = q; however, it fails to be symmetric. We
adapt DKL to score the distance between algorithms by taking the its average over
possible input sequences, as illustrated below.
For each n ∈ N, let On denote the set of interaction histories of length n. Deﬁne
DnKL, the nth expected Kullback-Leibler divergence from λ to A as:
DnKL(λ ‖ A) =
∑
X∈On
Prob(X | λ) ·DKL
(
Prob( · | X λ) ‖ A( · | X)),
That is,
DnKL(λ ‖ A) =
∑
X∈On
Prob(X | λ) ·
k∑
i=1
Prob(yi | Xλ) log2
(
P (yi | X λ)
A(yi | X)
)
.
Note that, for each possible input sequence X ∈ On, we evaluate the algorithm’s
performance as DKL(Prob( · | X λ) ‖ A( · | X)), i.e. we accept that some algorithms
may perform poorly on very unlikely training sequences X, whilst providing excel-
lent results frequent inputs. Hence, we weigh the performance on each input X by
the intrinsic probability of sequence X. In other terms, we compute the expected
information divergence for inputs of size n.
While Kullback and Leibler’s information divergence is a well-established mea-
sure in statistics, to our knowledge measuring probabilistic algorithms via DnKL
is new. Due to the relation to Shannon’s information theory, one can interpret
DnKL(λ ‖ A) quantitatively as the expected number of bits of information one would
gain by knowing the ‘true’ distribution Prob( · | X λ) on all training sequences of
length n, rather than its approximation A( · | X).
2.1.1 An example.
In order to exemplify our measure, we compare the β-based algorithm of Mui et
al [16] with the maximum-likelihood algorithm of Aberer and Despotovic [7]. The
comparison is possible as the algorithms share the same fundamental assumptions
that:
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each principal’s behaviour is so that there is a ﬁxed parameter Θ that at each
interaction we have, independently of anything we know about other interactions,
probability Θ of ‘success’ and, therefore, probability 1−Θ of ‘failure.’
We refer to these as the β-model λB. With s and f standing respectively for
‘success’ and ‘failure,’ an n-fold experiment is a sequence X ∈ {s, f}n, for some
n > 0. The likelihood of X ∈ {s, f}n is given by
Prob(X | ΘλB) = Θ#s(X)(1−Θ)#f (X),
where #x(X) denotes the number of occurrences x in X. Using A and B to denote
respectively the algorithm of Mui et al, and of Aberer and Despotovic, we have that:
A(s | X) = #s(X) + 1
n + 2
and A(f | X) = #f (X) + 1
n + 2
,
B(s | X) = #s(X)
n
and B(f | X) = #f (X)
n
.
For each choice of Θ ∈ [0, 1] and each choice of training-sequence length n, we
can compare the two algorithms by computing and comparing DnKL(ΘλB ‖ A) and
DnKL(ΘλB ‖ B).
Theorem 2.1 If Θ = 0 or Θ = 1, Aberer and Despotovic’s algorithm B from [7]
computes a better approximation of the principal’s behaviour than Mui et al’s algo-
rithm A from [16]. In fact, under the assumptions, B always computes the exact
probability of success on any possible training sequence.
Proof. Assume that Θ = 0, and let n > 0. The only n-sequence with non-zero
probability is fn, and we have B(f | fn) = 1; in contrast, A(f | fn) = (n+1)/(n+2),
while A(s | fn) = 1/(n + 2)). Since Prob(s | fn ΘλB) = Θ = 0 = B(s | fn) and
Prob(f | fn ΘλB) = 1−Θ = 1 = B(f | fn), we can conclude that
DnKL(ΘλB ‖ B) = 0.
Since DnKL(ΘλB ‖ A) > 0 we are done. (The argument for Θ = 1 is similar). 
Let us now compare A and B for 0 < Θ < 1. Observe that B assigns probability
0 to s on input fk for all k ≥ 1; this results in DnKL(ΘλB ‖ B) = ∞. It follows
necessarily that in this case A provides a better approximation.
In order to explore the space of β-based algorithms further, we deﬁne a para-
metric algorithm A, for  ≥ 0, that encompasses both A and B:
A(s | h) = #s(h) + |h|+ 2 and A(s | X) =
#f (h) + 
|h| + 2 .
Observe that A0 = B and A1 = A.
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Let us now study the expression DnKL(ΘλB ‖ A) as a function of . We shall
prove that for each Θ = 1/2 and independently of n there is a unique  which min-
imises the distance DnKL(ΘλB ‖ A). Furthermore, DnKL(ΘλB ‖ A) is decreasing
on the interval (0, ¯] and increasing on the interval [¯,∞). (Notice of course that
DnKL(ΘλB ‖ A)→∞ when  → 0.) By deﬁnition, we have:
DnKL(ΘλB ‖A) =
n∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
Θi(1−Θ)n−i
[
Θ log
Θ(n + 2)
i + 
+(1−Θ) log (1−Θ)(n + 2)
n− i + 
]
.
Isolating the terms that contain , we obtain
n∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
Θi(1−Θ)n−i
[
Θ logΘ + (1−Θ) log(1−Θ)
]
+ log(n + 2)
−
n∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
Θi(1−Θ)n−i
[
Θ log(i + ) + (1−Θ) log(n− i + )
]
.
By diﬀerentiating DnKL(ΘλB ‖ A) with respect to epsilon, we obtain
d
d
DnKL(ΘλB ‖ A) =
2α
n + 2
−
n∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
Θi(1−Θ)n−i
[
Θα
i + 
+
(1−Θ)α
n− i + 
]
,
where α = log e is a positive constant obtained when diﬀerentiating the function
log. In order to ﬁnd a minimal point for the information diverge, let us examine
which  nullify the derivative dDnKL(ΘλB ‖ A)/d. The bulk of the calculation
is illustrated in Fig. 1. Observe that since
∑n
i=0 i
(
n
i
)
Θi(1 − Θ)n−i is the expected
number of successes in a Bernoulli trial of length n, it equals Θn. Similarly, one
can show that
n∑
i=0
i2
(
n
i
)
Θi(1−Θ)n−i = n(n− 1)Θ2 + Θn.
These equalities lets us write equation (1) in a simpler form:
(2Θ − 1)(nΘ− n/2) = n(n− 1)Θ2 + Θn−Θn(n/2 +Θn) + Θn2/2.
We therefore have (2Θ− 1)(nΘ−n/2) = (2Θ− 1)n(Θ− 1) = (2Θ− 1)2 n/2, and
n(n− 1)Θ2 + Θn−Θn(n/2 + Θn) + Θn2/2 =
n2(Θ2 −Θ/2−Θ2 + Θ/2) + n(Θ−Θ2) = nΘ(1−Θ).
Since (2Θ − 1)2 is non-zero when Θ = 1/2, we obtain that dDnKL(ΘλB ‖ A)/d is
nulliﬁed if and only if Θ = 1/2 and
 =
2Θ(1 −Θ)
(2Θ − 1)2 .
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dd
DnKL(ΘλB ‖ A) = 0
	
n∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
Θi(1−Θ)n−i
[
1
n/2 + 
− Θ
i + 
− (1−Θ)
n− i + 
]
= 0
	
n∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
Θi(1−Θ)n−i
[
(i + )(n− i + )−Θ(n/2 + )(n− i + )
− (1−Θ)(n/2 + )(i + )
]
= 0
	
2
n∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
Θi(1−Θ)n−i
[
1−Θ− (1−Θ)
]
+

n∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
Θi(1−Θ)n−i
[
i + n− i−Θ(3n/2− i)− (1−Θ)(n/2 + i)
]
+
n∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
Θi(1−Θ)n−i
[
i(n − i)− θ(n2/2− ni/2)− ni(1−Θ)/2
]
= 0
	

n∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
Θi(1−Θ)n−i [(2Θ − 1)(i− n/2)] +
n∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
Θi(1−Θ)n−i [(Θn− i)(i − n/2)] = 0
	

n∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
θi(1−θ)n−i
[
(2θ − 1)(i − n
2
)
]
=
n∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
θi(1−θ)n−i
[
(i− θn)(i− n
2
)
]
(1)
Fig. 1. Solving the equation dDn
KL
(ΘλB ‖ A)/d = 0.
Remarkably, this is independent of n. Also, from the same derivation we immedi-
ately obtain that
d
d
DnKL(ΘλB ‖ A) < 0 ⇐⇒  <
2Θ(1−Θ)
(2Θ − 1)2
and
d
d
DnKL(ΘλB ‖ A) > 0 ⇐⇒  >
2Θ(1−Θ)
(2Θ − 1)2
We have therefore proved the following.
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Theorem 2.2 For any Θ ∈ [0, 1/2)∪ (1/2, 1] there exists  ∈ [0,∞) that minimises
DnKL(ΘλB ‖ A) simultaneously for all n; viz.,  = 2Θ(1−Θ)/(2Θ − 1)2.
Furthermore, DnKL(ΘλB ‖ A) is a decreasing function of  in the interval (0,  )
and increasing in ( ,∞).
This means that unless the principal’s behaviour is completely unbiased, then
there exists a unique best A algorithm that outperforms all the others, for all n.
If instead Θ = 1/2, then the larger the , the better the algorithm. Regarding
A and B, an application of Theorem 2.2 tells us that the former is optimal for
Θ = 1/2 ± 1/√12, whilst –as anticipated by Theorem 2.1– the latter is such for
Θ = 0 and Θ = 1.
Concluding this section, it is useful to remark that it is not so much the com-
parison of algorithms A and B that interests us; rather, the message is that using
formal probabilistic models enables such mathematical comparisons and, more in
general, to investigate properties of models and algorithms.
3 Probabilistic Event Structures
Agents in a distributed system obtain information by eﬀecting behavioural obser-
vations, typically triggered by exchanging messages. The structure of such message
exchanges is usually given in the form of protocols known to both parties before
the interaction begins. By behavioural observations, we mean observations that
the parties can make about speciﬁc runs of such protocols. These include infor-
mation about the contents of messages, diversion from protocols, failure to receive
a message within a certain time-frame, and more. Here as in previous work (cf.
[17,14,13]) we use event structures to formalise the concepts of protocols, observa-
tions, and outcomes.
Event structures are well suited to our present purposes, as they provide a
generic model for events (i.e., basic observables) and causation that is independent
of any speciﬁc programming language and higher-level model. In our model, the
information that an agent holds about another agent’s behaviour, is information
about a number of protocol-runs with it, organised as a sequence of sets of events,
or conﬁgurations, x1x2 · · · xn. Conﬁguration xi represents the ith run of the protocol
(e.g., ordered chronologically by starting times), and collects all the events happened
up to that point in that instance of the protocol; xi may represent a completed
protocol-run, in which case it records the complete outcome of an interaction, or
an running one, in which case more events will be added to it as the computation
proceeds. Note that, as opposed to many existing systems, here we are not rating
the behaviour of principals; we are instead recording their actual behaviour, i.e.,
the precise events occurred in the interaction. We will later equip the model with
probability measures so as to rate interaction outcomes and therefore assess the
likelihood of future interactions.
Although event structures were the model of choice for computing ‘trust values’
of distributed interactions in the SECURE project [3,4], we did not use in that
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context a formal probabilistic model of principal behaviour. In the next two sec-
tions, we amend that: we augment event structure framework with a probabilistic
model which generalises the one used in systems based on the beta-distribution
[12,16,2,22], and we show how to compute the probabilities of outcomes given a
history of observations. While this could be valuable in its own right, we remark
that our primary reason is to illustrate an example of a formal probabilistic model
which enables formal questions to be asked (and answered). The proposed system
is not yet practical: there are in fact many issues it does not handle, as e.g., changes
of principal behaviours, lying reputation sources, and multiple execution contexts.
We believe that the basic probabilistic model must be better understood before we
can deal with such issues successfully.
3.1 Event structures
We brieﬂy recaptulate the basic deﬁnitions, whilst referring the reader to [17,14,13]
for more details and examples. An event structure is a triple ES = (E,≤,#)
consisting of a set E of events which are partially ordered by ≤, the necessity (or
causality) relation; the conﬂict relation # is a binary, symmetric, irreﬂexive relation
on events. They satisfy the following properties for all e, e′, e′′ ∈ E.
[e]
def
= {e′ ∈ E | e′ ≤ e} is ﬁnite;
if e # e′ and e′ ≤ e′′ then e # e′′
The intention behind all this should be intuitive. An event may exclude the
possibility of the occurrence of other events; this is what the conﬂict relation models.
The necessity relation represents the idea that events are only possible when others,
their causes, have already occurred. Finally, if two events are in neither of the
relations, they are said to be independent. The two conditions above are therefore
that events must be ﬁnitely-caused and that conﬂict extents along with causation.
An event structure models the set of events that can occur in a particular pro-
tocol; the control ﬂow is provided by ≤ and #, that guarantee that not all sets of
events can occur in a particular run. The notion of conﬁgurations formalises this
as follows. A set of events x ⊆ E is a conﬁguration of ES if it is
Conﬂict free: for any e, e′ ∈ x : not e # e′; and
Causally closed: for any e ∈ x, e′ ∈ E : e′ ≤ e implies e′ ∈ x.
We write CES for the set of conﬁgurations of ES . The set of all maximal con-
ﬁgurations, i.e., conﬁguration that cannot be extended, deﬁnes the set outcomes of
an interaction exhaustively. Such conﬁgurations are of course mutually exclusive.
3.2 Histories
A ﬁnite conﬁguration models information regarding a single interaction, i.e., a single
run of a protocol. In general, the information that one principal possesses about
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another consists of information about several protocol runs; the information about
each individual run being represented by a conﬁguration in the corresponding event
structure. The concept of a (local) interaction history models this. An interaction
history in ES is a ﬁnite ordered sequence of conﬁgurations, h = x1x2 · · · xn ∈ C∗ES .
The entries xi are called sessions of h.
Remarks. While the order of sessions is recorded (that is, histories are sequences),
in contrast, the order of independent events within a single session is not. Inde-
pendence of events is in fact a choice of abstraction one may make when designing
an event-structure model (because one is not interested in the particular order of
events, or because the exact recording of the order of events is not feasible). This
is of course a feature and not a limitation of event structures: in a scenario where
ordering events is both relevant and observable, one can always use a suitably ‘se-
rialised’ event structure to record it.
3.3 Confusion-Free Event Structures
In the following we consider a special type of event structures, so-called confusion
free, to which it is especially simple to adjoin probabilities [23]. As we shall see, the
key for that is to assure that all ‘choice points’ –here called cells– are independent
of each other. This amounts to requiring that the occurrence of an event does not
aﬀect the relative probabilities inside cells, even though it may of course rule out
entire cells. This will be achieved by guaranteeing that each event belongs to at
most one cell and that conﬂict behaves uniformly on cells.
Consider the following event structure as an aid to ﬁx ideas in the following
deﬁnitions (∼ represents conﬂict, and → represents causality).
c  d e  f
a  b
 

 

Events c and e are independent, as are the following pairs: c and f; d and e; and d
and f. In event structures, this simply means that both events in independent pairs
can occur in any order in the same conﬁguration. We aim at deﬁning a probabilistic
model where independence also means probabilistic independence. To such end we
present the concepts of cell and immediate conﬂict [23].
Let ES = (E,≤,#) be a ﬁxed event structure. Write [e) for [e]  {e}, and say
that events e, e′ ∈ E are in immediate conﬂict, in symbol e #μ e′, if
e # e′ and both [e) ∪ [e′] and [e] ∪ [e′) are conﬁgurations.
Clearly, a conﬂict e # e′ is immediate if-and-only-if there exists a conﬁguration x
where both e and e′ are enabled. This means that they can occur at the same time
in x. For example the conﬂict a # b is immediate, whereas a # c is not.
A partial cell is a non-empty set of events c ⊆ E such that e, e′ ∈ c implies
e #μ e
′ and [e) = [e′). A maximal partial cell is called a cell. This entails that in
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order to complete from [e), the computation will have to ‘pick’ exactly one event
from the cell. Cells represent choices. There are three cells in the above event
structure: {a, b}, {c, d} and {e, f}.
A confusion free event structure is an event structure where immediate conﬂict is
a transitive relation and is within cells, i.e., e #μ e
′ implies [e) = [e′). In confusion-
free event structures, if an event of a cell c is enabled at conﬁguration x, then
all events of c are enabled at x. This is because if e is in conﬂict with some
e′ ∈ c, then e is in conﬂict with all e′ ∈ c. If the event structure is also ﬁnite, a
maximal conﬁguration (i.e., an outcome of an interaction) is obtained by starting
with the empty conﬁguration and then repeating the following. Let C be the set
of cells that are enabled in the current conﬁguration. If C is empty then stop, as
the current conﬁguration is maximal; otherwise, non-deterministically select a cell
c ∈ C, and then non-deterministically select (or probabilistically sample) an event
e ∈ c. Update the current conﬁguration by adding e.
The concept of cell-valuation formalises probabilistic sampling in cells. Here and
in the following, for f : X → [0,+∞] a function and Y ⊆ X a set, we use f [Y ] to
denote
∑
y∈Y f(y).
Deﬁnition 3.1 (Cell valuation, Varacca et al [23]) A cell valuation on a confusion-
free event structure ES = (E,≤,#) is a function p : E → [0, 1] such that for every
cell c, we have p[c] = 1.
If we assume (probabilistic) independence between events in cells, then we can
compute the probability of any conﬁguration x occurring simply as the product of
the probabilities of the constituting events.
Proposition 3.2 ([23]) Let p be a cell valuation, and write p(x) for
∏
e∈x p(e);
then
• p(∅) = 1;
• p(x) ≥ p(x′), if x ⊆ x′;
• p(x) = p[C], if C is a maximal set of conﬁgurations covering x;
• p is a probability distribution on maximal conﬁgurations.
In the formulation above, we say y covers x to mean y = x ∪ {e} for some e.
Observe that the implication of Proposition 3.2 is that p(x) must be interpreted as
the probability that the (partial) conﬁguration x is contained in the outcome of the
computation. On maximal conﬁgurations, p yields a probability distribution. With
reference to the event structure of our running example, the assignment
{a → 1/4; b → 3/4; c → 4/5; d → 1/5; e → 3/5; f → 2/5}
is easily seen to represent a cell valuation. The entire structure of conﬁgurations
and their probabilities is given in Fig 2.
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{b,c,e}9/25 {b,d,e} 9/100 {b,c,f}6/25 {b,d,f} 6/100
{b,e}9/20
 {b,c} 3/5


{b,d}3/20
																		
 {b,f} 3/10

{a}
1/4
{b}
3/4
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Fig. 2. An example of cell valuation and the probabilities of conﬁgurations
4 A Bayesian framework for event-based models
As illustrated in the previous section, ﬁnding a cell valuation p : E → [0, 1] is
the key step to assign probabilities to the conﬁgurations of a ﬁnite, confusion-
free event structure ES . Observe that to give one such p is to give for each cell
c a function pc : c → [0, 1] with pc[c] = 1, i.e., a probability distribution. Our
assumption is, typical of the Bayesian approach, that the distributions pc exists
independently and immutably; our intention is, equally typical, for them to be
‘learned’ via experiments, that in our case means derived from the past history of
interactions with an external entity. Under the following heading, we state explicitly
the assumptions about the behaviour of entities in our model. We then proceed to
(i) ﬁnd abstractions that preserve suﬃcient information under the model; and (ii)
derive equations for predictive probabilities, i.e., formulae to answer questions such
as “what is the probability of outcome x in the next interaction with entity q?”
4.1 The model
Let ES be a ﬁnite, confusion-free event structure ES and C(ES ) = {c1, c2, . . . , cM}
its set of its cells, where ci = {ei1, . . . , eiKi}. We write λDES for the following
assumptions of our model:
each principal’s behaviour is so that there are ﬁxed parameters Θci such that
at each interaction there is, independently of anything we know about other in-
teractions, probability distribution Θci for the events of cell ci to occur, if ci is
enabled.
Such basic data are equivalent to give a probability Θe to each event e of ES , so
that
∑Ki
k=1 Θeik
= 1. The collection Θ = (Θc1, . . . ,ΘcM ) determines a cell valuation
on ES . It follows from our assumption that for each conﬁguration x ∈ CES the
probability of obtaining x in any run of ES with a principal parametrised by Θ is
Prob(x | ΘλDES) =
∏
e∈x
Θe. (2)
M. Nielsen et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 172 (2007) 499–521512
In way of comparison with model λB described in §2, λDES assigns probabilities
to (maximal) conﬁgurations to the same eﬀect as λB does for the binary outcomes
{s, f}. In this case however, the assignment is not ‘atomic,’ but obtained via a cell
evaluation, i.e., an assignment of probability distributions to cells and, ultimately,
to basic events. While the occurrence of an x from {s, f} is a binomial (Bernoulli)
trial, the occurrence of an event from ci is a random process with Ki outcomes.
That is, a multinomial trial on Θci . To exploit this analogy, we therefore only need
to lift the framework of §2 to one based on multinomial experiments. In particular,
we shall need to identify a family of distributions that can play here the same role
as the β-distribution does there.
Firstly, we observe that in order to estimate the parameters Θ given a prior
distribution, we only need a simple event count, i.e., a function X : E → N. In fact,
in force of Eq. (2), it is suﬃcient to estimate the parameters Θc for each cell c. It
then follows from the assumptions of λDES that a count X of the event occurrences
in h is the only signiﬁcant information for any sequence h ∈ C∗ES of data observed
about a ﬁxed principal.
Secondly, in order to apply Bayesian analysis, we need prior distributions. As
we intend to use our estimates to determine expected values for entire distributions,
it is fundamental that we are able to compute them in symbolic form. This is one of
the roles of conjugate priors. We phrase the following deﬁnition with terminology
used in the Introduction to illustrate Bayes’ Theorem.
Deﬁnition 4.1 A family F of probability distributions is a conjugate prior for a
likelihood function L if whenever the prior distribution belongs to F , then also the
posterior distribution belongs to F .
Indeed, the use of conjugate priors generally aﬀords a signiﬁcant computational
convenience in Bayesian analysis, in that the distributions always maintain the
same algebraic form. As we shall see below, it turns out that the family of Dirichlet
distributions is a family of conjugate prior distributions for multinomial trials.
The use of Dirichlet distributions as priors completes the picture of our appli-
cation of Bayes’ Theorem to event structures. Speciﬁcally, a prior Dirichlet distri-
bution is assigned to each cell c of ES . Event counts X are then used to update
the Dirichlet at each cell. Hence, at any time we have for each cell c a Dirichlet
distribution on the parameters Θc of that cell. We will show that the probability of
an outcome x ⊆ E is then the product of certain expectations of these distributions.
4.2 The Dirichlet distribution
The Dirichlet family D of order K, for 2 ≤ K ∈ N, is a parametrised collection
of continuous probability density functions (pdf) deﬁned on [0, 1]K ; K parameters
of positive reals, α = (α1, . . . , αK), select a speciﬁc Dirichlet distribution from the
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family. For a variable Θ = (Θ1, . . . ,ΘK) ∈ [0, 1]K , the pdf is given by:
D(Θ | α) = Γ(
∑
i αi)∏
i Γ(αi)
·
∏
Θα1−11 · · ·ΘαK−1K ,
where the Gamma function, Γ(z) =
∫∞
0 t
z−1e−t dt, for z > 0, is used to deﬁne the
normalisation constant. Luckily, we shall not be explicitly concerned with such a
constant. The main values of interests in our application are the expected value
and the variance of variables distributed according to D( · | α) which, importantly,
depend only on α. Namely, using [α] as a shorthand for
∑
j αj , we have:
ED(Θ|α)(Θi) =
αi
[α]
σ2D(Θ|α)(Θi) =
αi([α]− αi)
[α]2([α] + 1)
(3)
4.3 A conjugate prior
Consider sequences of independent experiments with K-ary outcomes, each yielding
outcome i with some ﬁxed probability Θi; such experiments are multinomial trials
(and in our framework correspond to the probabilistic choice of one event at a cell).
Let λD denote a model collecting such hypothesis, and let Xi represent the ith trial
(i = 1, . . . , n). In other words, Zi ≡ (Xi = ji) is the statement that the ith trial
has outcome ji ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K}. Let Z = (Z1, . . . , Zn) be the conjunction of n such
statements. Then, by deﬁnition of multinomial trials, the sequence of independent
experiments has the following likelihood:
Prob(Z | ΘλD) =
n∏
i=1
Prob(Zi | ΘλD) =
K∏
i=1
Θ
#i(Z)
i ,
where #i(Z) is the number of occurrences of i in Z.
The Dirichlet distributions constitute a family of conjugate prior distributions
for this likelihood. In order to illustrate this fact, let us recall that according to
Bayes’ Theorem one can derive from the prior distribution on Θ, say f(Θ | λD),
and the experiments Z, a posterior distribution f(Θ | Z λD) as:
f(Θ | Z λD) = f(Θ | λD)Prob(Z | ΘλD)
Prob(Z | λD) .
In fact, it is not hard to show that when f(Θ | λD) is a Dirichlet distribution, say
D(Θ | α1, . . . , αK), then f(Θ | Z λD) is a Dirichlet distribution too; viz.,
f(Θ | Z λD) = D
(
Θ | α1 + #1(Z), . . . , αK + #K(Z)
)
,
which is what we wanted. Note that by choosing αi = 1 for all i, the Dirichlet
distribution degenerates to the uniform distribution on [0, 1]K . This is very useful,
as it provides a convenient unbiased initial prior for those cases, relatively frequent
in our application domain, where we have no prior information on principals.
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4.4 Predictive probability in the Dirichlet model λD
Let us now consider the statement Zn+1 ≡ (Xn+1 = i) before performing the
n + 1 experiment. We can then can interpret Prob(Zn+1 | ZλD) as a predictive
probability: given no direct knowledge of Θ, but only past evidence (viz., Z) and
the model (viz., λD), then Prob(Zn+1 | Z λD) is the probability that the next trial
will result in outcome i. It is easy to show that:
Prob(Zn+1 | Z λD) = Ef(Θ|ZλD)(Θi) =
αi +#i(Z)
[α] + n
In fact, the predictive probability that the n + 1th outcome is i is obviously the
expectation of the ith parameter of the posterior computed after the experiments
Z. Then, given the Dirichlet expression above for f(Θ | Z λD) and the fact that∑
i #i(Z) = n, the results follows from the expectation formula (3). We remark
that the variance formula can be used at any time to evaluate the accuracy of our
prediction: the lower the variance, the more likely the prediction.
4.5 Dirichlet distributions on cells
Returning to our event structure model, we will associate to each cell c ∈ C(ES )
a Dirichlet prior distribution on the parameters Θc determining the behaviour of
a ﬁxed principal for the events of c. As we interact with the principal, we use
Bayes’ Theorem and the formulae derived above to tighten the parameters to the
observation and therefore sharpen our ability to predict outcomes via the predictive
probability. Each cell c ∈ C(ES ) presents a choice between the mutually exclu-
sive and exhaustive events of c, and by the assumptions of λDES such choices are
multinomial trials. At any time, we obtain the predictive probability of the next
interaction resulting in a particular conﬁguration by multiplying the expectations
of the parameters for each event in the conﬁguration.
Let us be precise. Let fc(Θc | λDES) denote the prior distribution for c ∈ C(ES),
and let there be a positive real number αe associated to each e ∈ E. We use αci as
a shorthand for the vector of parameters associated to ci, i.e., (αei
1
, . . . , αei
Ki
). We
are then just left with the task of adapting the formulae of §4.3. We have:
fci(Θci | λDES) = D(Θci | αci) =
Γ([αci ])∏Ki
k=1 Γ(αeik
)
·
Ki∏
k=1
Θ
α
ei
k
−1
ei
k
.
Let X : E → N be an event count that models the observations about past runs
with a speciﬁc principal. The posterior pdf is given below, where + denotes both
scalar and vector sum, and X(ci) = (X(e
i
1), . . . ,X(e
i
Ki
)).
fci(Θci | X λDES) = D
(
Θci | αci+X(ci)
)
=
Γ([αci + X(ci)])∏Ki
k=1 Γ(αeik
+ X(eik))
·
Ki∏
k=1
Θ
α
ei
k
+X(ei
k
)−1
ei
k
.
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Such ﬁerce-looking formula is in reality very simple: it just states that each
event count X : E → N can be used to do Bayesian updating of our cell valuation
simply by adding X(e) to αe, for each e ∈ E.
4.6 Predictive probability in the model λDES
Also in this case, we merely need to adapt the formulae derived in §4.4. Let X
be an event count corresponding to the observation of n previous conﬁgurations
x1 · · · xn in the interaction with a ﬁxed principal. Let Z be the proposition that
“the (n+1)’st interaction results in outcome x.” According to the independence
hypotheses made in λDES, the predictive probability Prob(Z | X λDES) is the
product of the probabilities of occurrence of each e ∈ x. But the probability of eij
occurring, provided its cell ci is enabled, is exactly the expected value of Θeij
, and
since we know the pdfs fc(Θc | X λDES) for all c ∈ CES , we can use the expectation
formulae (3).
E(Θeij
| X λDES) =
αeij
+ X(eij)[
αci + X(ci)
] .
The predictive probability is therefore the product of the expectations of each
of the cell parameters.
Prob(next outcome is x | X λDES) = Prob(Z | X λDES)
=
∏
e∈x
E(Θe | X λDES) =
∏
eij∈x
αeij
+ X(eij)[
αci + X(ci)
] .
4.7 Summary
We have presented a probabilistic model λDES based on probabilistic confusion-free
event structures. The model generalises previous work on probabilistic models using
binary outcomes and β prior distributions. In our model, given a past history with
a principal we need only remember the event counts of the past, i.e., a function X :
E → N. Given such an event count, there is a unique probability of any particular
conﬁguration occurring as the next interaction. We have derived equations for this
probability and it is easily computed in real systems.
With reference to the event structure of our running example, suppose we have
the following event count X.
c : 7  d : 1 e : 3  f : 5
a : 2  b : 8

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If we assume to start with uniform priors, i.e., αe = 1 for e ∈ {a, b, c, d, e, f},
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then X gives rise to the following updated Dirichlet distributions.
f{a,b}(Θa,Θb | X λDES) = D(Θa,Θb | 3, 9),
f{c,d}(Θc,Θd | X λDES) = D(Θc,Θd | 8, 2),
f{e,f}(Θe,Θf | X λDES) = D(Θe,Θf | 4, 6).
As an example, the probability of conﬁguration {b, c} is
Prob({b, c} | X λDES) = 9
12
× 8
10
=
3
5
.
In fact, the cell valuation arising from this is the one illustrated in Fig 2.
5 Towards a formal model of dynamic behaviour
In this section we reﬂect on what has been achieved in this paper, but mainly on
what has not. Our main motivation when we started this investigation was to put
on formal grounds what we had been seeing in the literature, so as to be able to
ask sharp questions of our data. We succeeded in this to a comforting extent, both
by presenting the ﬁrst ever formal framework for the comparisons of computational
trust algorithms and by extending a well-known formal concurrency model with a
framework for Bayesian analysis.
However, while the purpose of models may not be to ﬁt the data but to sharpen
the questions, good models must do both! Our probabilistic models must be more
realistic. For example, the β-model of principal behaviour (which we consider to be
state-of-the-art) assumes that for each principal p there is a single ﬁxed parameter
Θp so at each interaction, independently of anything else we know, the probability
of a ‘good’ outcome is Θp of the one of ‘bad’ outcome is 1− Θp. One might argue
that this is unrealistic for some applications. In particular, the model allows for no
dynamic behaviour, while in reality not only the p is likely to change its behaviour in
time, as its environmental conditions change, but p’s behaviour in interactions with
q is likely to depend on q’s behaviour in interactions with p. The same criticisms
apply of course to the Dirichlet model we presented here.
Some beta-based reputation systems attempt to deal with the ﬁrst problem by
introducing so-called ‘forgetting factors.’ Essentially this amounts to choosing a
factor 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, and then each time the parameters (α, β) of the pdf for Θp are
updated, they are also scaled by δ. In particular, when observing a single ‘good’
interaction, (α, β) becomes (αδ+1, βδ) rather than (α, β). Eﬀectively, this performs
a form of exponential ‘decay’ on parameters. The idea is that information about old
interactions is less relevant than new information, as it is more likely to be outdated.
This approach represents a departure from the probabilistic beta model, where all
interactions ‘weigh’ equally, and in the absence of any mathematical it is not clear
what the exact beneﬁts of this bias towards newer information is. Regarding the
second problem, to our knowledge it has not yet been considered in the literature.
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π1 = 1
B1(a) = .95
B1(b) = .05
O = {a, b}
π2 = 0
B2(a) = .05
B2(b) = .95
Fig. 3. Example Hidden Markov Model.
Let us point out some ideas towards reﬁning such hypothesis and embracing the
fact that the behaviour of p depends on its internal state, which is likely to change
over time. Suppose we model p as a kind of Markov chain, a probabilistic ﬁnite-state
system with n states S = {1, 2, . . . , n} and n2 transition probabilities tij ∈ [0, 1],
with
∑n
j=1 tij = 1. After each interaction, p changes state according to t: it takes a
transition from state i to state j with probability tij. Such state-changes are likely
in our context to be unobservable: a principal q does not know for certain which
state principal p is in. All that q can observe, now as before, is the outcome of
its interactions with p; based on that, it must make inferences on p’s likely state
and future actions. If we accept the ﬁnite state assumption and the Markovian
transition probabilities, we can then incorporate unobservable states in the model
by using so-called Hidden Markov Models [19].
A discrete Hidden Markov Model (HMM) is a tuple λ = (S, π, t,O, s) where S is
a ﬁnite set of states; π is a distribution on S, the initial distribution; t : S × S →
[0, 1] is the transition matrix, with
∑
j∈S tij = 1; ﬁnite set O is the set of possible
observations; and where s : S × O → [0, 1], the signal, assigns to each state j ∈ S,
a distribution sj on observations, i.e.,
∑
o∈O sj(o) = 1.
An example. Consider the HMM in Figure 3. This models a simple two-state
process with two possible observable outputs a and b. For example, this could model
a channel which can forward a packet or drop it. State 1 models the normal mode of
operation, whereas state 2 models operation under high load. Suppose that output
a means ‘packet forwarded’ and output b means ‘packet dropped.’ Most of the time,
the channel is in state 1, and packets are forwarded with probability .95; occasionally
the channel will transit to state 2 where packets are dropped with probability .95.
Although this example is just meant to illustrate a simple HMM, we expect that by
tuning their parameters Hidden Markov Models can provide an interesting model
many of the dynamic behaviours needed for probabilistic trust-based systems.
Consider now an observation sequence, h = a10b2 (that is ten a’s followed by
two b’s), which is reasonably probable in our model on Figure 3. The ﬁnal fragment
consisting of two consecutive occurrences of b’s makes it likely that a state-change
from 1 to 2 has occurred. Nevertheless, a simple counting algorithm, say H, would
probably assign high probability to the event that a will happen next:
H(a | h) = #a(a
10b2) + 1
|h|+ 2 = 11/14 ∼ .80
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However, if a state-change has indeed occurred, that probability would be as low as
.05.
Suppose now exponential decay is used, e.g., as in the Beta reputation system
[12], with a factor of δ = .5. This means that the last observation weighs approxi-
mately the same as the rest of the history; in such a case, the algorithm would adapt
quickly, and assign probability H(a | h) ∼ .25, which is a much better estimate.
However, suppose that we now observe bb and then another a. Again this would
be reasonably likely in state 2, and would make a state-change to 1 probable in
the model. The exponential forgetting would assign a high weight to a, but also a
high weight to b, because the last four observations were b’s. In a sense, perhaps
the algorithm adapts ‘too quickly,’ it is too sensitive to new observations. So, no
matter what δ is, it appears easy to describe situations where it does not reach
its intended objective; our main point here is the same as for our comparisons of
computational trust algorithms in §2: that the underlying assumptions behind a
computational idea (e.g., the exponential decay) need to be speciﬁed, and that for-
mal models for principal’s behaviour (e.g., HMMs) may serve the purpose, allowing
precise questions on the applicability of the computational idea.
6 Conclusion
Our ‘position’ on computational trust research is that any proposed system should
be able to answer two fundamental questions precisely: What are the assumptions
about the intended environments for the system? And what is the objective of the
system? An advantage of formal probabilistic models is that they enable rigorous
answers to these questions. To illustrate the point, we have presented an example
of a formal probabilistic model, λDES. The central technical contribution here has
been to recast one of the best known and most popular models of concurrency,
the event structures, in a framework for Bayesian analysis. This allows ‘learning’
and ‘prediction’ of composite, multi-event structured outcomes (viz., event struc-
ture conﬁgurations) in complex interaction protocols (viz., event structures). We
anticipate the model will be useful in several applications, even though in the paper
we discussed some of its shortcomings and hinted at future developments.
Among the several beneﬁts of formal probabilistic models, we have focussed on
the possibility to compare algorithms, say X and Y, that work under the same
assumption on principal behaviours. The comparison technique we proposed relies
on Kullback and Liebler’s information diverge, and consists of measuring which
algorithm best approximates the ‘true’ principal behaviour postulated by the model.
For example, in order to compare X and Y in the model λ, we propose to compute
and compare
DnKL(λ ‖ X ) and DnKL(λ ‖ Y).
Note that no simulations of algorithms X and Y are necessary; the mathematics
provide a theoretical justiﬁcation –rooted in concepts from Information Theory–
stating e.g. that “in environment λ, on average, algorithm X outperforms algorithm
Y on training sequences of length n.” Using our method in this paper we have
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been successful in showing a novel theoretical comparison between two β-based
algorithms well-known in the literature. Moreover, we explored the entire space of
β-based algorithms and proved constructively that for each principal behaviour Θ,
there exists a best approximating algorithm. Remarkably, this does not depend on
n, the length of the training sequence. We regard this as the main result of the
paper. More generally, another type of property one might desire to prove using
the notion of information diverge is that limn→∞D
n
KL(λ ‖ X ) = 0, meaning that
algorithm X approximates the true principal behaviour to an arbitrary precision,
given a suﬃciently long training sequence.
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